





	In the following essay I will discuss the nature of Free will, examining two specific arguments for and against its existence. The first, from Peter Van Inwagon, known as the objection from chance and the other, by Laura Ekstrom in response to Van Inwagon, which we'll call the Teleological defense from chance. I intend to expose two fatal flaws in Eskrom's argument which will reveal that her argument actually fails to adequately respond to Van Inwagon's argument. The first, that Ekstrom mistakenly assumes that if an action (X) is probabilistically caused by some event (Y), then it does not entail event (Y) determined action (X), which I believe it does. Even if I fail to convince the reader of this, the second flaw will prove an undeniable defeater, as I will show that Ekstrom's proposed 'alternative' view is subject to the same chanciness Van Inwagon initially describes. Thus Ekstrom's defense, even if reasonable, still leads to the same sort of mysteriousness she is trying to deny. 
	In the final section of this essay I will offer my own explanation of Van Inwagon's mysterious free will. I argue that the feeling of free will is merely the result of our unique first-person view of our minds' decision making process, which amount to nothing more than magnificently complex algorithms. The sensational experience of free will, I will argue, is fundamentally no different than the subjective sensational experiences of colors, or tastes, or sounds. Though it is unique and inexplicable to each of us, it is ultimately beyond our control.
	In Laura Ekstrom's  2003 essay, “Free Will, Chance, and Mystery” Ekstrom proposes a reconciliation between Libertarian freedom of the will and Causal Indeterminism, arguing specifically against an argument posed by Peter Van Inwagon in his 2002 essay, “The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will” which Ekstrom coins “Mysterianism”. In his essay, Van Inwagon argues that free will is impossible not only if Determinism is true but also if Indeterminism is true. Since one of those two must be true then free will must be impossible and the feeling of free will which I experience when I consider decisions is essentially a mystery. Though Van Inwagon  does offer one possible explanation, though he does not commit stoutly to it, that perhaps the illusion of free will is an evolutionary, psychological necessity for survival. Ekstrom objects to this argument however (specifically where Van Inwagon argues free will's incompatibility with causal Indeterminism), and argues that no definition of the word “chance” can be accurately applied to Van Inwagon's argument. Ekstrom claims that if we suppose any one of the three descriptions of chance she lays out it will render Van Inwagon's argument invalid.
	Although Ekstrom does not respond to Van Inwagon's first proposition that free will is incompatible with determinism, for my own sake I will briefly describe his argument in support of this proposition, something he calls the, “No Choice Principle”. Van Inwagon's No Choice Principle states that if determinism is relevant, then human actions cannot influence the universe at all and are therefore, not free. This is due to the conflicting natures of Determinism and Free will. Determinism states that current events, actions, and states of affairs are the inevitable, necessary consequences of prior events, actions, and states of affairs. Free will, Van Inwagon argues, can only exist in the presence of possible alternate choices. This is to say that unless an agent actually has the option to choose either action (A) or action (B), they are not free. A slave in shackles, for example, is physically restrained from leaving, they do not have the option to leave and so they are not free to choose to leave. Consequently, if some uncontrollable event which occurred millions of years ago necessarily resulted in some action of mine, then I never really had any choice in regards to that action. This is also called the principle of transferred uncontrollability, since my inability to control  the event which necessarily resulted in the action transfers to my inability to control the action.
	Ekstrom's argument is specifically aimed at Van Inwagon's proposition that Free will is incompatible with Indeterminism. This proposition is argued for by Van Inwagon in the following manner: 1) If human action is undetermined, then it is a matter-of-chance. 2) If human action is a matter-of-chance, then it is not subject to the will. 3) If human action is not subject to the will, then there is no free will. Van Inwagon supports these propositions with a teleological argument first against the compatibility of Indeterminism and accountability, and second for the necessary contingency of free will upon accountability. His argument goes like so; Suppose Jane can choose either (A) to speak or (B) to remain silent. An electrical pulse moves along her cerebral cortex until it reaches a fork; Speak or don't speak, (A) or (B). The Indeterminist will assert that there is no possible way to predict which path the neural pulse will take. Up until the instant of decision there are no laws or processes of Jane's mind which necessarily dictate the neural pulses' path, the pulse may go either (A) or (B). But if nothing in Jane's mind determines the neural pulses' path, Van Inwagon argues, then she cannot be said to have control of her decision. In this Indeterminist scenario Jane's choice appears to be a matter of chance, or luck, rather than of her own volitions.
	But what of Agent-casuation, which supposes that the cause of Jane's neural pulse going one way as opposes to the other is her agency? Van Inwagon doesn't believe this sufficiently answers the mystery of free will – Indeterminism, although he admits that he may not fully understand the agent-causation theory. Van Inwagon actually defends the theory of agent-causation against two popular objections in the form of questions, though in doing so shows how the theory is irrelevant to the issue of free will. The first question/objection is, “What does one add to the assertion that Jane decided to speak when one says that she was the agent-cause of her decision to speak?” To which Van Inwagon responds, “causation itself is a mystery, not just agent-causation.” Consider conversely what is added to the assertion, 'two events occurred in succession' when one says the prior caused the later? Causal relations are mysterious themselves, so if we accept some relations despite this, we should accept all relations like-wise.
	The second question/objection is, “What about Jane's becoming the agent-cause of her decision to speak?” which is to ask, “Did Jane choose to choose?” Van Inwagon response is that Jane chose to become either the agent-cause of her speaking or the agent-cause of her remaining silent. She also decided to be the Agent-cause of deciding to become the agent-cause of on of those choices, and she id also the agent-cause of that decision too, and so on forever. Even though this seems to go into an infinite regress, Van Inwagon claims this is not a problem for agent-causation since the agent is not required to be aware of all the decisions she makes. I think Van Inwagon's reasoning here is unnecessary, there is no need for the agent to have control over which decisions are presented to her for her to be the agent-cause of her decision. Suppose that Jane never made any decision to become the agent-cause of her decision, she still makes the decision. In fact, the decision is forced upon Jane by external forces and it is such that she must decide one way or the other. She cannot choose not to choose, she must either speak or remain silent. She cannot choose both or neither on virtue of her options being mutually exclusive. So there is no need to rely on an infinite regress to explain Jane's becoming the agent-cause of her decision.
	In either case, the question which remains is, “What prompt's the agent's choice to become the agent-cause of her action?” To this, Van Inwagon asserts, the agent-causation doctrine offers no explanation and does not, therefore, oppose his argument for chance.
	Van Inwagon, having now shown that free will is impossible whether Determinism is true or Indeterminism is true, considers his own feeling of free will. When one considers whether or not to do something, say go out tonight or stay in, the possibilities appear fully open to us. Free will seems apparent in that instant and it is only after something has occurred or not occurred that we say it could not have been any other way. This feeling of free will is paradoxical considering what Van Inwagon has just shown. Though Van Inwagon does offer one possible explanation, that free will is an evolutionary, psychological necessity for survival. Van Inwagon supposes that were a person to actually believe they have no free will, choices would be impossible for them to consider and they would never act. Recall the previous example of the shackled slave. The slave cannot decide to leave, in fact he cannot even consider the decision since he already believes he is incapable of making a choice. The slave can only choose what he would do if he were not shackled, which Van Inwagon claims is not the same. I disagree with this assertion but I will return to this after first discussing Ekstrom's response.
	Ekstrom argues that Van Inwagon's argument hinges on a sort of “slight-of-hand” regarding his definition of “chance”. Ekstrom extrapolates three possible descriptions of “chance” (Chance1, chance2, and chance3) and argues that, when applied to Van Inwagon's argument, each description results in Van Inwagon's argument being invalidated. It is only by alternating between descriptions without notice that Van Inwagon's argument holds up. In response, Ekstrom offers her own view of free will libertarianism  which states that  “An act is free if an only if it results by a normal causal process from a preference for the act, a preference that has undefeated authorization” (Ekstrom 2003) A preference has undefeated authorization when the agent is not coerced during the formation of the preference and the preference is caused but not determined by her considerations. Whether those considerations are indeterminate is irrelevant to the agent's free will, which Ekstrom claims is in control of the process as a whole. I'm not sure this view accurately responds to Van Inwagon's argument, but I will present it as though it does before offering my critique.
	Chance1 is described as a mysterious force or determiner, which Ekstrom immediately disregards as being “highly implausible” since this description seems to imply some inexplicable, external willing. Chance2 is describes as an event with no purposive explanation and chance3 is described as an event which, prior to its occurrence, had a probability of occurring less than 1. Since the first Chance description is highly implausible, Ekstrom focuses on the other two, applying them each to two of Van Inwagon's propositions; (1) If an act is undetermined, then it is a matter-of-chance. (2) If an act is a matter-of-chance, then it is not subject to the will.
	If we apply the description of chance2 (purposelessness) to the argument proposition (1) is false, since not all undetermined events are purposeless. In her argument, Ekstrom proposes a teleological account of purpose. She asserts that somethings being undetermined does not necessarily result in its being purposeless. Actions, she claims, always have purposes. She gives the example of someone who makes a decision one way at one time, but if we go back before she made that decision she would make a different decision each time we go back. Even though her choice is different each time, she always has a purpose for her decision. Her purpose in each case would be her preference to bring about a state of affairs by acting in someway, resulting from her probabilistic considerations. Recall the example of Jane choosing to speak or remain silent. Suppose she chooses to speak for whatever reason, and suppose we could go back in time to just before Jane chooses to speak and replay the decision but this time she remains silent. Even if this happens another 725 times, each time Jane chooses either to speak or remain silent without any apparent pattern, either of her choices can be purposely explained. When Jane deliberates between her choices she considers her reasons for each, these reasons are the same as her purposes. If Jane has an reason for speaking, then she has a purpose for speaking, and if Jane has a reason for remaining silent, then she has a purpose for remaining silent. Therefore chance2 cannot be used for this proposition, and it must be chance3 (probability).
	But chance3 (probability) also fails, when applied to Van Inwagon's next proposition. Just because something is caused probabilistically, doesn't mean it is not subject to the will. Ekstrom considers her own view of free will libertarianism as an example of this. In Ekstrom's view the considerations used in deliberation are weighted by the agent's conception of the good. The weight attributed to each consideration results it the final probability of preference formation. Given this view, preferences are ultimately formed by probable causal antecedents, but they are still subject to the will. So neither chance2 nor chance3 can be accurately applied to both of Van Inwagon's propositions, and it is only by alternating between the two does his argument stand up.
	But does Eksrtom's view really solve the mystery of free will posed by Van Inwagon? Obviously Ekstrom thinks so, but I'm not so sure. My objections to Ekstrom's argument are two-fold; first is the notion that our considerations can cause but not determine our preferences, and second that the view she gives in response, in fact fails to adequately respond to Van Inwagon's assertion. Before I get to these objections though, I want to bring attention to Ekstrom's first description of chance. Chance as being a mysterious force or determiner actually fits perfectly into Van Inwagon's argument. If an action is undetermined, then it is caused by chance1, and if it is caused by chance1, then it is not subject to an agent's will. Yet this sort of chanciness seems highly implausible according to Ekstrom herself. How can something fulfill all the requirements set out by Ekstrom and still be highly implausible? This something Ekstrom does not explain, but which I believe requires some explanation.
	The first objection for Eksrom's view is the notion that our considerations can cause but not determine our preferences. This notion strikes me as odd. Can anything which is the cause of something else not be said to determine that thing as well? Ekstrom believes so, but I think she is mistaken. If we say the X caused Y, then we are saying that Y was determined by X. Ekstrom claims that if X is merely probabilistic then it does not determine Y, but in the case where X does not result in Y, X has not caused Y either. If X only probabilistically determines Y, then it only probabilistically causes Y. I can think of no case in which something can cause some further action but not determine it!
	Ekstrom's view of free will libertarianism fails to adequately respond to Van Inwagon's proposed argument. Ekstrom's view merely lessens the requirements for free will to a standard so low it no longer resembles the previous requirements. Ekstrom claims that an action which is undetermined is not purposeless and is therefore still subject to the will. But this is not what Van Inwagon argues against. Van Inwagon argues that an action can be caused by an agent, undetermined, but not free. Ekstrom's response only states that the agent can have some influence over the formation of the preference and by extension the action. But she does not offer a reason for her calling this free will. If our preferences are formed by probabilistic considerations then they are ultimately still subject to chance. Just because the agent has a purpose for choosing something doesn't mean she had free will to make that decision. For example, suppose Bob is allergic to peanuts and is being offered a plate of cookies with peanuts in them. Bob deliberates over his considerations to eat a cookie or not. On the one hand, Bob loves cookies and Bob is curious about the taste of peanuts since he has never had one before, on the other hand if Bob eats a peanut cookie he may possible die. Assuming Ekstrom's view, Bob will probably for a preference to pass on the cookies, but there is always the slight possibility that he will form the preference to eat a cookie. This seems to me to fall short of the requirements for free will. If Bob had true free will there would be no chance of his eating the cookie (assuming Bob wishes to live). In Ekstrom's view, even if it were 99.99% probable that Bob passes on a cookie, we should not be at all surprised at the 0.01% of the time Bob shoves a cookie in his mouth and goes into anaphylactic shock. How can Bob be in control of his decisions, want to live, yet intentionally choose to greatly endanger his life? The only explanation is that Bob is not fully in control of his decisions and they are, to some extent, chancy.
	 I hope I have effectively shown how Ekstrom's account fails to rectify the problem presented by Van Inwagon. In any case, I will now offer an alternate reason to that of Van Inwagon's, for the presence of the unique feeling of Free will. Van Inwagon asserts that his feeling of free will seems so concrete that it must be real, even if it is only a psychological necessity. I agree with this assertion somewhat, though I think such an elaborate explanation of the subjective phenomenon in question is unwarranted. I would ask Van Inwagon, “How should it feel to make a decision which is not free?” I propose the feeling of free will is nothing more than a mistake in nomenclature. We feel as though we have the freedom to choose between (A) or (B) prior to our deliberations, but once we have decided we realize that our decision is the necessary product of our deliberations. We perceive no mystery in our deliberations because they are our deliberations. We are actively engaged in the process and so it must appear open until we reach the conclusion. Suppose you are watching the coded processes of a computer after you hit a key. Suppose that the computer is so slow that it takes several hours (much longer than a human would be able to compute) to run through the code used to render a response to your pushing a key. Whilst watching the code progress it is unclear how the computer will eventually react to the key input, in fact it may seem as if the computer's code may result in any number of reactions. However, before the code is finished running you can use your own reasoning abilities to follow the code to its logical conclusion. Now you know what will happen once the computer is finished deliberating, but the computer does not yet know. Much in the same way, my subjective feeling of free will is merely my first-person view of my own unfinished deliberations. This unique phenomenon is no different essentially than that our unique phenomenon of red.

